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Negligence: Abolition of the Defense of Charitable ImmunityThe plaintiff was a mentally ill, non-charity patient who alleged she refractured her hip and suffered other injuries in a fall from her hospital
bed. According to the complaint the guard rails on the bed were not in
a raised position, notwithstanding the express directions of her attending physicians. The defendant hospital denied these allegations and
further moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was a charitable institution and as such was entitled to immunity from tort liability
arising from negligence of the type alleged. The trial court denied summary judgment on the ground that questions of fact concerning the hospital's charitable status were presented. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's denial of the motion for summary judgment
without considering the question of the hospital's status as a charitable
institution. The court stated that it was "assuming that the defendant
is a charitable hospital and operates as such," and its holding abolished
the doctrine that a private charitable institution is not liable to paying
patients for injuries caused by the negligence of its servants. Kojis v.
Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961).
By the holding of the Kojis case that charitable hospitals are liable
to paying patients, Wisconsin thus becomes the nineteenth state to join
a recent and growing trend to abolish the charitable immunity doctrine.'
This trend was given great impetus by the "devastating" 2 opinion in the
'Arizona, Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951);
Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Tucson v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P. 2d
455 (1952) ; Alaska, Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska 546
(1952); Tuengel v. City of Sitka (D.C. Alaska) 118 F. Supp. 399 (1954);
California, Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P. 2d 241 (1951) ; Colorado,
St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952) ; Delaware, Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 7 Terry, Del. 350, 83 A. 2d 7593 (1951) ;
Florida, Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344
(1940) ; Suwannee County Hospital Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla.,
1952); Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So. 2d 40 (Fla., 1953); Iowa,
Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151 (1950) ;
Wittmer v. Letts, 248 Iowa 648, 80 N.W. 2d 561 (1957); Kansas, Noel v.
Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954) ; But see footnote
44 infra where it would seem this has been changed by statute in Kansas;
Michigan, Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1; 105 N.W. 2d 1 (1960) ;
Minnesota, Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392,
175 N.W. 699 (1920); Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.
2d 217 (1956); New Hampshire, Welsh v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90
N.H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939); Kardulas v. Dover, 99 N.H. 359, 111 A. 2d
327 (1955); New York, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 143
N.E. 2d 3 (1957); North Dakota, Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital,
74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W. 2d 247 (1946); Oklahoma, Gable v. Salvation Army,
186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940); Puerto Rico, Tavarez v. San Juan
B.P.O.E., 68 Puerto Rico 681 (1948); Utah (apparently), Brigham Young
Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F. 2d 836 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Vermont, Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950); Washington,
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d
765 (1953) ; Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. Wash., 1955) ;
and Wisconsin, Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d (1961).
See 25 A.L.R. 2d 29-200 and the 1960 and 1961 supplemental service for a
more detailel analysis.
2 PR0SoER, TORTS 784 (2d ed. 1955)..(It perhaps is interesting to note the dissent
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landmark case of President and Directors of Georgetown College v.
Hughes,3 a case which influenced the court in the Kojis case as follows:
"We were particularly impressed by the logic in the opinion of justice
Rutledge and the manner in which he answered the arguments for the
'4
rule in the light of present day conditions."
Historically the courts of the various states have granted immunity
to charitable institutions on several different theories. In a recent cases
the Michigan court reviewed the charitable immunity doctrine and
stated that aside from the trust fund theory which it had previously
adopted, the immunity was based upon "the theory holding the doctrine
of respondeat superior inapplicable to charitable institutions; the theory
that such institutions are entitled to the rule of governmental immunity;
the theory of implied waiver or assumption of risk; and the theory of
public policy."'6 These diverse approaches demonstrate that the courts
in the past consistently had felt that the immunity was desirable, but no
one definite reason presented itself as a ground for their decisions.
Seemingly, the modern trend of abolishing the doctrine indicates that
the desirability is gone, whatever may have been the reasons for its
creation.
In the Kojis case the court stated that the doctrine of immunity was
originally based upon public policy in Wisconsin, evidently a policy that
required the encouragement of "quasi-public" institutions that could not
develop without such immunity. However, the court's present reasoning
is that times have changed, the hospitals "are now larger in size, better
endowed, and on a more-sound economic basis."7 Therefore, the court
felt these changed conditions required a change in public policy, a duty
ordinarily left to the legislature. The Wisconsin court considered the
argument that it was a question to be decided by the legislature rather
than the court, but dismissed it despite the fact that it had held on previous occasions that matters of public policy are for the legislature and
not the court. For instance, only eight years earlier in the Smith case, s
the court stated:
by Judge Putnam in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135
N.E. 2d 410, 418 (1956), where he stated, "I desire only to point out that the
arguments of Judge Rutledge failed to convince three members of his own
court. ... This would seem to cast grave doubt on the quoted statement from
Prosser on Torts to the effect that the Rutledge opinion completely demolished
all arguments against immunity.")
3 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D.C. 123,
130 Fed. 2d 810 (1942).
4 Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 372, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 133 (1961).
5 Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W. 2d 1 (1960).
6 Id. at 105 N.W. 2d 8.
7 Supra note 4, at 372, 107 N.W. 2d at 134.
s Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 397-398, 61 N.W. 2d 896
(1953). Similarly, Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 6 Wis.
2d 44, 47, 93 N.W. 2d 867 (1959); and Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202 at 217,
209 N.W. 475 (1926). -
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We find it unnecessary to explore into this question of historical background because this court has long felt that the reasons for granting such immunity to charitable and religious corporations are archaic, and if this court were not bound by the rule
of stare decisis but were passing on the question for the first time,
we would accord very little weight to the historical reasons originally advanced in support of the rule of immunity. However, we
feel that it is for the legislature and not the court to change the
rule of immunity at this late date after its wide acceptance over
the years in the prior decisions of this court.
In reviewing the history of charitable immunity in Wisconsin, the
court, in the Kojis decision, cites the McDonald9 case which was the
landmark decision in the annals of charitable immunity in America and
the Morrison ° case which was the first instance in which the Wisconsin
court granted the immunity.
To understand the impact and possible extension of the Kojis decision, it is important to observe the development and the former limitations of the immunity theory in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin court has
reversed its own precedent of forty-four year standing which had granted
to charitable institutions an almost sacred immunity from liability for
negligence. The doctrine had been established in the Morrison" case
on the ground of public policy. There the court held that in suits by
paying patients, the doctrine of respondeat superior should not be applied to such charitable institutions since they were performing a quasipublic function.' 2 Then in the Bachman 3 decision the court held that
the institution was immune from suit for the negligence of its employees
causing injuries to strangers; in the Schumacher14 case the court held
that a charity was immune from liability even for the negligent selection
of its employees. However, certain limitations were imposed: in the
Carlsonr' 5 case a municipal hospital was held liable when acting in a
proprietary capacity; in the Wilson' 6 case it was held that a charitable
9 McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
10 Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1917).
"1Ibid.
12Morrison v. Henke, supra note 10, at 170, "...
[31 ustice and sound public
policy alike dictate that it should be exempt from the liability ..
13 Bachman v. Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922).
'4 Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476
(1935).
15 Carlson v. Marinette County, 264 Wis. 423, 59 N.W. 2d 486 (1952).
16 Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930).
This was due to the interpretation given Wis. STATS. §101.01 (12) and (13)
and §101.06; the charitable organization was liable because it was not excepted
in the statutes. Sec. 101.01 (12) defines "public building" and (13) defines
"owner" Sec. 101.06 reads as follows:
Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be safe for
the employees therein and shall furnish a place of employment which
shall be safe for employees therein and for frequenters thereof and
shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, and shall adopt
and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such
employment and places of employment safe, and shall do every other
thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and welfare of
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institution was liable for the violation of the safe-place statute; in the
Smith 7 case a charitable institution was held liable for a nuisance
created or permitted by it. In summary, prior to the Kojis case charitable institutions in Wisconsin enjoyed a complete immunity aside from
liability for nuisance and a violation of the safe-place statute.
The reasons advanced in the Kojis case for changing this rule of
immunity seem to be based upon the changed conditions and character
of charitable hospitals that have developed since the time the immunity
was originally granted in 1917.1s A corollary to this reason is the
availability of liability insurance to the hospital. The Kojis court stated:
"Insurance covering their liability is available and prudent management
would dictate that such protection be purchased ..- the financial statement of the defendant [hospital] clearly shows that the judgment for
damages in the present action would not cause it to suspend its operation
or to be seriously hampered therein."'91 (Query: What would have been
the holding if the demand of the complaint had been substantially larger
and the hospital was in such a financial position that a recovery would
have caused suspension of operations?)
There can be little argument concerning the fact that present-day
hospitals are now larger and in better financial condition than they were
forty years ago. But one might take issue with the logic of basing liability on the availability of insurance. The theory behind liability insurance is that the insured will be protected from a legally incurred
liability. Logically the liability would have to be incurred before the
insurance would have any bearing on the matter. As the Massachusetts
court said in McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op Industriesand Stores,20
"The defendant by taking out insurance would not enlarge its liability
for negligence, even though by reason of such insurance damages might
such employees and frequenters. Every employer and every owner
of a place of employment or a public building now or hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair or maintain such place of employment or public building as to render the same safe.

In accord: Zimmers v. Sebastian's Congregation, 258 Wis. 496, 46 N.W. 2d 820

(1951); Grabinski v. St. Francis Hospital, 266 Wis. 339, 63 N.W. 2d 693,
(19554) ; Bent v. Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 252 N.W. 290 (1934) ; Jaeger v. Evangelican Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation, 219 Wis. 209, 262 N.W. 585 (1935) ;
Wright v. St. Mary's Hospital of Franciscan Sisters, 265 Wis. 502, 61 N.W.
2d 900 (1953) ; Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation, 264 Wis. 626, 60 N.W. 2d
349 (1953) ; Watry v. Carmelite Sisters, 274 Wis. 415, 80 N.W. 2d 397 (1957).
'1 Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W. 2d 896 (1953).
8

"Nuisance, unhappily, has been sort of a legal garbage can." Prosser, Nuisance
Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. Rav. 399, 410 (1942).

1 Supra note 10.
19 Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, supra note 4, at 372, 107 N.W. 2d, at 134.
20 272 Mass. 121, 126, 172 N.E. 68, 70 (1930). In accord: Schau v. Morgan, 241
Wis. 334, 6 N.W. 2d 212 (1942) ; Enman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270
Mass. 299, 170 N.E. 43 (1930) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App.
375, 2 P. 2d 520 (1931) ; Williams v. Church Home, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W. 2d 753
(1928); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465
(1930). Contra: O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanatarium Ass'n, 105 Col.
259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939).
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be paid to the plaintiff without diverting funds for charitable purposes."
Not even the so-called "deep-pocket" theory of legal liability can justify
the conclusion that since you have insurance you are to be held liable.
Liability should rest on firmer footing-on more logical reasoning. Insurance is a loss spreading, risk sharing device. The premiums received
by the insurance company must at least equal the claims paid plus operating expenses. Hospitals must obtain this money to pay premiums. If
hospitals that are charitable in nature are to be held liable, as they now
are in Wisconsin, and therefore should avail themselves of insurance
protection, it will mean higher operating costs which will in turn mean
higher charges for paying patients.
Since the Kojis case involved a paying patient, the court limited its
decision to paying patients in charitable hospitals. With regard to nonpaying patients, Justice Rutledge said in the Georgetown case, "Retention [of immunity] for the non-paying patient is the least defensible
and most unfortunate of the distinction's refinements. .

.

. He should

be the first to have reparation, not last and least among those who receive it."21 Remembering that our court was "particularly impressed"
with Justice Rutledge's reasoning, it would seem that now a non-paying
patient at a charitable hospital will be able to recover in Wisconsin.
The Kojis decision is predicated upon the defendant's classification
as a charitable hospital, but by analogy it can readily be extended to
include all charitable institutions (other than those with state and municipal affiliations) such as orphanages, homes for the aged, schools, etc.
They are all, like the hospitals, performing a quasi-public function by
ministering to the needy without pecuniary profit and as such have enjoyed the same immunity in the past. Their basic difference from other
22
private endeavors of the same general type is their non-profit aspect.

It can be assumed that they are now better endowed, larger in size, and
have insurance available. At least, there is no doubt now that wise and
prudent management would dictate that they also buy such insurance,23
since the trend is definitely away from such immunity.
The Wisconsin court has mentioned in several charitable immunity
21130

Fed. 2d 810, 827 (1942).

22 Bachman v. Y.W.C.A., supra note 13, at 180, 191 N.W. at 752. "The fundamental reason why a charitable organization should not be held liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior is not based upon any situation that the injured person may occupy towards the charitable corporation, but upon the
inherent and well recognized distinction between such charitable corporations,
organized as they are with the primary and principal purpose of assisting the
sick, unfortunate, or needy, or other instance of deserving humanity, and without provision for or expectancy of receiving financial returns for such particular sevice, compared with corporations which are primarily and principally
organized for or in expectation of private gain." See also Wisconsin Statutes,
Chapters 181 and 187, especially Wis. STAT. §181.02(4) "'Nonprofit corporation means a corporation, no part of the income of which is distributable
to its members, directors or officers."
23 Supra note 19.
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cases that the institutions are immune due to the similarity of their
functions with those of municipalities which have been held to be immune. For instance, the Schumacher case:
The basis of the rule adopted by this court exempting charitable hospitals from liability for the negligence of their servants
is . . . that, because these hospitals perform a quasi-public function, akin to that performed by municipalities in performing governmental functions, justice and public policy require
that the
24
doctrine of respondeat superior should not be applied.
The abolition of charitable immunities in the Kojis case could be the
foreshadowing of the abolition of municipal immunities. The same
reasoning for denying immunity is applicable in both situations. The
person injured should be granted the same right to recover in the one
instance as in the other. Municipal immunity has recently been abolished
in Illinois 25 and in California.2 6 The California opinion referred to such
governmental immunities as "an anachronism, without rational basis,
...[which] has existed only by force of inertia.... None of the reasons
for its continuance can withstand analysis." 27 In the Britten28 case the
Wisconsin court discussed the distinction between granting immunity
to the municipality when acting in a governmental capacity and holding
it liable in a proprietary capacity, and went on to state:
The doctrine that immunity from liability should be granted
to the state and municipalities while engaged in governmental
operations rests upon a weak foundation. Its origin seems to be
found in the ancient and fallacious notion that the king can do no
wrong. The rule is one of such long standing and has become so
firmly established as a parcel of Wisconsin's jurisprudence, however, that we should hesitate to abandon it. We consider that if it
is to be abandoned it is only proper that the request therefor
should be made to the legislature. But we do consider that the
precedent . . . [lacks]
support in both logic and reason...
29
[Emphasis added.]
24 Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society of Wisconsin, supra note 14, at
172, 260 N.W. at 477. Also Morrison v. Henke, supra note 10, at 170-71, 160
N.W. at 174; Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, supra note 8, at 397, 61 N.W.
2d at 898, such immunities are archaic; Apfelbacher v. State, 160 Wis. 565,
25 152 N.W. 144 (1915).
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.
2d 89 (1959). A charitable institution in Illinois enjoys complete immunity upon
the "trust fund theory." Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 II1. 381, 75
N.E. 991 (1905). However, this immunity-is limited to just the trust property
and would not prevent execution on property which is not in trust, in a tort
action. Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
26 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, P. 2d (1961).
(Public convenience does not outweigh individual compensation.) A non-governmental charitable institution has no immunity in California. Malloy v. Fong,
37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P. 2d 241 (1951).
27Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, supranote 26, at 92.
28 Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis.
29 Id. at 386. See also Smith v.

382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952).
Congregation of St. Rose, supra note 8, at 397,
61 N.W. 2d at 898. (Reasons for immunities archaic.)
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It should be noted that prior to the Kojis case the Wisconsin court
stated that the charitable immunity doctrine was archaic but its abolition
was for the legislature, a function which the court adopted for itself in
the Kojis case. The Wisconsin court had held municipalities liable for
violation of the safe-place statute ° and for creating or permitting a
nuisance,31 the same exceptions it had made to the charitable immunity
doctrine 2 before the Koji, decision. The argument that it was for the
legislature and not for the courts to make the change from immunity to
liability seems to be weakened, if not totally destroyed by the Kojis
decision. Having noted the striking similarity between the decisions
concerning governmental and charitable immunities, it would hardly be
surprising or startling for the Wisconsin court to take the next short
step and abolish municipal immunities, a step taken by the California
court with the following explanation:
Only the vestigial remains of such governmental immunity
have survived; its requiem has long been foreshadowed. For
years the process of erosion of governmental immunity has gone
on unabated. The Legislature has contributed mightily to that
erosion. The courts, by distinction and extension, have removed
much of the force of the rule. Thus in holding that, the doctrine
of governmental immunity for torts for which its agents are
liable has no place in our law we are making no startling break
with the past but merely take the final step that carries
to its con33
clusion an established legislative and judicial trend.
In Wisconsin and many other jurisdictions, an unemancipated minor
may not maintain an action against his parents to recover for injuries
due to negligence. 34 Most of these cases arise out of automobile accidents, and the Wisconsin court has been most consistent in denying recovery.3 5 Many reasons have been propounded why such recovery should
be denied, viz.: (1) the great danger of fraud between child and parent
if insurance is involved (2) the possibility that the child might die and
the recovery would be inherited by the parent tortfeasor (3) depletion
of the family coffers, and (4) the disruptive tendency such suits would
have on family harmony. In Wisconsin a wife has been allowed to sue
30 Heiden v. City of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 92, 275 N.W. 922 (1937).
31 Rogb v. City of Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 432, 6 N.W. 2d 222 (1943).
32 Supra notes 15, 16 and 17. See also Prosser supra note 2, at 774-780 for a

review of municipal immunities and his interpretation of "proprietary" and
"governmental" functions. The decision of the Muskopf case, supra note 26,
also has an excellent discussion.
33 Supra note 26, at 95.
34 See 19 A.L.R. 2d 423-462 (1951).
35 Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927) ; Zutter v. O'Connell, 200
Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930) ; Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 271
N.W. 374 (1937) ; Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940) ; Cronin
v. Cronin, 244 Wis. 372, 12 N.W. 2d 677 (1944); Fidelity Savings Bank v.
Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W. 2d 613 (1948); and Schwenkhoff v. Farmer's
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W. 2d 867 (1959).
3GSupra note 34 and PRossER, ToRTs 675-677 (2d ed. 1955).
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the husband because of a statute giving her the right to maintain actions
in her own name.3 7 One might wonder whether there is a greater danger
of fraud where the child sues the parent than where the wife sues the
husband. The possibility that the wife might die and the husband recover part of the recovery would be greater than the possibility of the
child predeceasing the tortfeasor parent. As a practical matter the child
probably would not sue unless there was insurance involved. Furthermore, it would seem that a suit by a wife against the husband would be
much more disruptive of the family harmony than an action by a child
against its parent.
Dean Prosser said, "...
the height of inconsistency is reached by
some courts which permit action by the wife but deny it to the child."' s
And further, "the retreat from the common law rule as to parent and
child has lagged behind that as to husband and wife, apparently for no
better reason than the absence of such statutes as the Married Women's
39
Acts. It is however under way."
Two years before the Kojis decision, the Wisconsin court in the
Schwenkhoff case made the following statement in denying recovery to
an unemancipated minor, ". . .attention is called to the fact that the
Wick40 decision [the original Wisconsin decision denying an unemancipated minor the right to sue a parent in tort for negligence] was based
upon public policy [and] that matters of public policy are to be resolved
by the legislature. . - "41 As has been previously pointed out, in the
Kojis case an immunity question involving public policy was resolved
by the court.
A concurring opinion in the Schwenkhoff case discussed the objection of disrupting the family harmony.
Perhaps it would be no more disruptive of the family relationship to destroy the father's immunity from an action for
personal injuries brought by his child than it has been to destroy
the husband's immunity from similar action by his wife. Perhaps,
because the problem more frequently arises in connection with
injuries caused by the operation of automobiles, it would be
better simply to require that the automobile liability insurer of a
parent be directly liable to an injured child, notwithstanding
the
2
parent's immunity by reason of his parenthood.
Again, it is illogical to justify liability by insurance protection, and
, Wait v. Pierce, supra note 8.Wis. STAT. §246.07 (1959).
h"... any married woman may bring and maintain an action in
her own name for any injury to her person or character the same
as if she were sole."
38 Supra note 36, at 676.

Id. at 677.
supra note 35. Note especially the strong dissent.
41 Schwenkhoff v. Farmer's Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra note 35 at 47,
39

40 Wick v. Wick,
42

93 N.W. 2d at 869, aff'd, 11 Wis. 2d 97,
Ibid.

-

N.W. 2d

-

(1961).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

this reasoning is especially true where it is admitted that no liability
exists in the absence of such protection, but, as the Kojis case demonstrates, logical objections impose no barrier to the Wisconsin court if
insurance is involved. Although Missouri seems to be the only jurisdiction which has completely abolished the parent's immunity, at least
seventeen other jurisdictions hold the parent liable for willful or wanton
negligence. 43 The Wisconsin court is now demonstrating an ability to
resolve questions based upon public policy. Since the availability of insurance would protect the family coffers, and since the wife is permitted to sue the husband, it is not a remote possibility that an unemancipated minor will be allowed to recover from his parent in negligence cases.
In conclusion, the Kojis case not only destroys charitable immunities," but, also, it casts grave doubts as to the future longevity of defenses such as governmental immunity and parental immunity in Wisconsin.
DONALD F. FITZGERALD
Respondeat Superior, Basic Test for Application of DoctrinePlaintiff was injured when the automobile in which she was a passenger was struck by another auto driven by an employee of codefendants. Flodeen, the employee, was a day laborer of Tracy and
Son Farms, a co-partnership engaged in general farming.
In the normal routine of employment, laborers reported to the
home farm of Tracy and Son, where they received assignments to
work in designated fields. Transportation was customarily furnished
by the employer to carry the workers to the particular fields to
which they had been assigned.
On the day of the accident, Flodeen drove his car to the home
farm where he received his assignment to drive a tractor in a designated field. A truck, with driver, was on hand to take him and the
other workers to the fields. The weather threatened rain, and Flodeen told the foreman that he would drive his own car to the field,
so that if rain began and field work was discontinued he would not
48 Supra note 34.
4Judicial decisions abolishing the immunity have been reversed by statute in
three states. (1) Rhode Island: Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411
(1879); changed by sec. 38, ch. 177, R.I. Gen. Laws (1896); R.I. Gen. Laws
§7-1-22 (1956) ; cf. 44 MARQ. L. Ray. 153 at 159-160; see Morrison v. Henke,
165 Wis. 166, 169, 160 N.W. 173 (1917). (2) Kansas, Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954) overruled by statute, Laws of Kansas (1959) Chapter 127. (3) New Jersey has many cases denying immunity but
a statute was recently passed, though held not retroactive, granting immunity
to charitable associations from liability to any persons who suffer damages from
the negligence of any agents or servants of the charitable associations. L.
1959, c. 90, on June 11, 1959, N.J.S.A. 2A: 53 A-7 et seq. See 25 A.L.R. 2d 29200 in the 1960 and 1961 supplements.

